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Abstract—Coronavirus disease 2019, i.e. COVID-19 has 
imposed the public health measure of keeping social distancing 
for preventing mass transmission of COVID-19. For 
monitoring the social distancing and keeping the trace of 
transmission, we are obligated to develop various types of 
digital surveillance systems, which include contact tracing 
systems and drone-based monitoring systems. Due to the 
inconvenience of manual labor, traditional contact tracing 
systems are gradually replaced by the efficient automated 
contact tracing applications that are developed for 
smartphones. However, the commencement of automated 
contact tracing applications introduces the inevitable privacy 
and security challenges. Nevertheless, unawareness and/or lack 
of smartphone usage among mass people lead to drone-based 
monitoring systems. These systems also invite unwelcomed 
privacy and security challenges. This paper discusses the 
recently designed and developed digital surveillance system 
applications with their protocols deployed in several countries 
around the world. Their privacy and security challenges are 
discussed as well as analyzed from the viewpoint of privacy 
acts. Several recommendations are suggested separately for 
automated contact tracing systems and drone-based 
monitoring systems, which could further be explored and 
implemented afterwards to prevent any possible privacy 
violation and protect an unsuspecting person from any 
potential cyber attack. 
Keywords—COVID-19, Digital Surveillance System, Contact 
Tracing, Drone-based Monitoring, Privacy, Security, 
Recommendation.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) has immensely 
altered the global economy by confining people from daily 
commercial activities [1]. With no specific vaccine or 
medicine for preventing or curing [14], currently, the best 
approach to avoid COVID-19 is not to get ourselves 
exposed to it. Having close contact with other persons, 
which is approximately less than six feet [2], can 
significantly increase the likelihood of inhaling respiratory 
droplets from the infected persons by coughing, sneezing, or 
even talking [2]. Social distancing has to be preserved 
between all, as recent studies [15] have shown that 
asymptomatic people could silently propagate the disease 
without raising any suspicion. 
This social distancing invokes public health specialists 
and workers to join with the technical researchers to 
implement the digital surveillance systems (DSSs) to 
monitor people digitally, since the process is quite tedious to 
carry out manually. One of the foremost DSSs is known as 
automated contact tracing (ACT). To detect individuals who 
have recently come close in contact with COVID-19 
positive persons, ACT systems automates the traditional 
manual interview with the affected individuals which are 
administered by the health authorities. Instead of gathering 
the contacts the affected individual had with other 
individuals for the last 2-3 weeks through extensive 
interviews, the ACT systems using smartphone applications 
(apps) can be an excellent alternative which has been 
introduced, developed, and even deployed in some countries 
[3]. Also, it is quite challenging for people to reminisce of 
their last 2-3 weeks precisely when they can also affect 
other unknown persons in public places. Moreover, these 
interviews need a skilled workforce with continuous 
rigorous training, which is sometimes not feasible. 
Along with ACT apps that use smartphones and their 
location tracing via global positioning system (GPS), 
wireless-fidelity (Wi-Fi), built-in Bluetooth interface to 
communicate with and identify proximity with nearby 
smartphones, also make the privacy and security challenges 
emerging to a certain level of discomfort. The apps could be 
repurposed to target their users. collected data could be 
misused, several security  issues such as jamming, storage 
and power drain attacks, active and passive eavesdroppers, 
hacking security cameras used in ACT apps are just a few of 
them. 
Another prominent DSSs are drone-based monitoring 
systems. Drone belongs to a class of unmanned aerial 
vehicle (UAV) and it is the most common available UAV 
nowadays. The operational control of a drone can be divided 
into three categories [16], namely, remote pilot control, i.e. 
fully controlled manually by an operator; remote supervised 
control where the drone can perform a defined task 
autonomously but also allows for a human intervention at 
the same time, if necessary; and autonomous control in 
which the drone carries out a defined task on its own. 
However, drone surveillance may cause the violation of 
privacy if the image or video data is downloaded by an 
intruder, images or videos of an individual get stolen from a 
drone, Joint Photographic Experts Group (JPEG) image 
format that contains location and time information [17] falls 
into the wrong hands. Moreover, hijacking, GPS signal 
spoofing, control signal hacking, sending too many wireless 
connection requests can affect drone-based monitoring 
systems. 
This paper is organized as follows: Section I introduces 
the research topic; after defining the terminologies in section 
II, the relevant DSS tracing approaches, i.e. ACT apps and 
protocols are discussed along with drone-based monitoring 
systems in section III; the emerging privacy and security 
challenges are discussed and summarized in section IV and 
V respectively; merits and demerits of these diversified 
approaches are also analyzed in those sections. Finally, 
various recommendations are suggested to be explored and 
implemented as the future works in section VI. The paper 
concludes with section VII. 
II. DEFINITION OF TERMINOLOGIES 
Before discussing DSS tracing approaches, three 
separate approaches to the system architecture for 
developing DSS must be briefly discussed. First is the 
centralized approach, next is the decentralized one, and last 
but not least is the hybrid one that comprises both the 
centralized as well as the decentralized architecture features.  
In the centralized architecture, the user has to sign 
oneself up to a central server. The server then automatically 
creates a privacy-preserving Temporary ID (TempID) for 
each of the registered devices. TempID is encrypted with a 
secret key afterwards and known only to the central server's 
authority. Then it is sent back to the device. Devices 
exchange these TempIDs through Bluetooth encounter 
messages after coming in close contact with one another. 
Whenever a user has been tested COVID-19 positive, all of 
the stored encounter messages can be voluntarily uploaded 
to the central server. The server then maps the TempIDs 
from the messages of individuals to detect contacts that may 
be at any probable risk.  
Contrary to the approach of the centralized architecture, 
the decentralized architecture only involves servers as a 
limited medium, more as a bulletin board for the required 
lookup. It ensures user privacy by creating anonymous 
identifiers inside the user devices. So, the real user identities 
are kept secret from both the other users and the server. 
The ACT apps can only be successful when the users are 
assured about their privacy and security while using the app. 
A naive ACT approach could be building a privacy-agnostic 
system which is responsible for advertising and exchanging 
the mobile phone numbers of the users and registers their 
location time to time by a centralized server. Such a strategy 
would definitely raise severe privacy and security 
challenges. The system would most likely be rejected by the 
common users and thus jeopardize the initial intention. 
All ACT apps regardless of having a basis on 
centralized, decentralized, or hybrid architecture are 
vulnerable to user misuse. Moreover, ACT apps have failed 
to detect whether the mobile phone’s carrier is someone else 
or a pet being tied to and running in the park [3]. 
Prior to discussing privacy and security challenges, 
various terminologies need to be defined beforehand. First, 
an adversary is defined as a person who may or may not be 
tested for COVID-19 and can generate false fear to mass 
people by spreading fake exposure to COVID-19. 
Second, the adversary can attack in several ways. 
Eavesdropping is the process of gathering data sent by 
honest users. This can be done by hacking and controlling 
all mobile phones. Injection is another process by which an 
adversary is injecting messages by targeting some specific 
users. This one also involves hacking and controlling mobile 
phones. Relay attack is an attack where instead of direct 
attacking, relaying received messages through some other 
controlled phones to victims’ phones. Replay attack or 
attacking by replaying previously received messages to 
victims’ phones is carried out to take advantage of victims’ 
un-mindfulness [8]. 
Third, let us take a quick glance towards the privacy acts 
and laws. The health insurance portability and 
accountability act (HIPAA) was signed into a privacy law 
back on August 21, 1996, by then-president Clinton of the 
United States. For over the last twenty years, the federal 
department of health and human services (HHS) has 
released various rule sets within HIPAA’s scope and health 
information technology for economic and clinical 
(HITECH) act which is under the American recovery and 
reinvestment act (ARRA), signed into a law by then-
president Obama on February 17, 2009 [12]. 
On the other hand, the European Commission (EC) 
originated the idea for protecting its citizens on January 25, 
2012 regarding the personal data processing and the free 
movement of such kinds of data all over the internet. The 
European Union's (EU's) final General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR) was released on May 4, 2016, and was 
deployed on May 25, 2018 [12]. More about these acts, their 
applications and suggested recommendations will be 
discussed in the upcoming sections. 
Fourth, the drone mentioned in this literature 
communicates with the ground control over Wi-Fi or a radio 
channel [23]. The Wi-Fi channel is predominantly used for a 
short distance communication, a few hundreds of meters, 
whereas the long distance communication, thousands of 
meters, is done using radio waves. Multiple sensors are 
installed in a drone to achieve an optimal performance. 
Usually a drone has an on-board camera which is used to 
gather visual information in terms of either videos or still 
images. 
Multiple sensors are installed in a drone to achieve an 
optimal performance: 
Motion Sensors: Gyroscopes, Accelerometers, and 
magnetometers are used for an on flight auto stabilization 
and provide nine degrees of freedom to the drone for a wide 
range of movements. 
Global Positioning System (GPS): GPS is a satellite-
based radio navigation system used by the drone to navigate 
automatically during a flight and to accurately localize its 
position. 
Barometer: This device is used by the drone to estimate 
its altitude during a flight. 
Collision Avoidance Sensors: Ultrasonic sensors are the 
most common low cost sensors used to detect and avoid 
obstacles [26]. A more advanced technique relies on 
computer vision algorithms [27]. In the latter method, data 
is obtained from multiple on board cameras and analyzed 
using various image processing tools. 
Camera: Usually a drone has an on-board camera which 
is used to gather visual information in terms of either videos 
or still images. 
III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Governments in several countries have already 
employed DSS in the form of ACT apps or programs which 
use various devices and data sources. To name a few, ACT 
apps are being implemented in (alphabetically) Bahrain, 
China, Colombia, Czech Republic, Ghana, India, Israel, 
Japan, North Macedonia, Norway, Singapore, South Korea 
and several states in the United States [6]. However, 
Singapore and Taiwan were prepared for COVID-19 as the 
learning from the 2003 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome 
(SARS) outbreak was still a fresh memory to recall. 
Moreover, South Korea planned and organized well due to 
the lesson learned from the 2015 Middle Eastern 
Respiratory Syndrome (MERS). Japan, on the other hand, 
initially utilized the group mentality to inspire over self 
concern to deploy social distancing successfully [11].  
While China imposed their citizens on using the ACT 
app as compulsory, Singapore relaxed the usage as an 
elective one. Hong Kong forced to put on electronic 
wristbands to their COVID-19 positive persons for tracing 
the movement as well as monitoring whether they are going 
to leave or already leaving their homes. South Korea sent 
their regional habitants the government text messages which 
had included the details of rising cases of COVID-19 
pandemic through a central database having anonymous 
information. Taiwan, along with Israel, utilized their cell 
tower data. However, while Taiwan used it to employ 
quarantine geo-fencing, Israel used it for the ACT systems 
and processes [6]. 
Now, we focus on some related works focusing on the 
ACT apps and the associated protocols. First, the 
TraceTogether app is considered as the pioneer of the 
implemented ACT apps for mass people. It was endorsed by 
the Singaporean government back in March 2020. Second, 
CovidSafe was deployed by the Australian government in 
the last week of April 2020. CovidSafe abides by the 
Bluetrace protocol, same as TraceTogether. Third, ROBust 
and privacy-presERving proximity Tracing protocol, 
popularly known by its acronym ROBERT, is an ACT app 
protocol for the centralized approach. It is co-developed by 
the researchers from Institut National de Recherche en 
Informatique et en Automatique (INRIA) of France and 
Fraunhofer of Germany. The StopCovid app, abiding by the 
ROBERT protocol, has been released by the French 
government in early June 2020 and lacks enough privacy 
protection for its users [9]. 
Aarogya Setu is another ACT app which was 
implemented in India. It relies on the approach of 
centralized architecture. However, Apple and Google have 
used the decentralized architecture approach to co-build a 
privacy-preserving contact tracing (PPCT) [3]. The authors 
[7] proposed a PPCT app for COVID-19 using a zero-
knowledge protocol for assuring user privacy protection. No 
user is able to send any fake message to the system for 
raiding with a false positive attack. The ContactChaser [8] 
app is designed as such that a health authority is only 
required to issue group private keys to the users for only one 
single time. Frequent updating of keys with authority is not 
necessary. Therefore, the authority finds out the close 
contacts of affected people with minimum leakage of 
information. 
BeAware app has been designed and implemented by the 
Kingdom of Bahrain [13]. It tracks down the COVID-19 
positive persons by making them wear electronic bracelets, 
or e-bracelets. It provides the warning signal to the 
government whenever it suspects any suspicious activity is 
going on. It comprises Bluetooth with GPS for tracking the 
person’s movement efficiently. The ministry of health 
(MOH) in Saudi Arabia deployed an app, namely, 
“Tatamman” to restrict COVID-19 transmission [18]. The 
app not only provides friendly services to the detected cases 
for follow-up work and test results from laboratories, but 
also to the users who came close in contact with the affected 
persons [18]. 
Moving back to drone-based monitoring systems, 
Draganfly, a Canada-based advanced drone manufacturing 
company, has developed a “Pandemic Drone” that can scan 
a crowd and identify people with higher temperatures to 
indicate fever, monitor social distancing and detect 
coughing by an individual [19]. By measuring the rise in 
percentages of detected people with the abovementioned 
traits over many days, an offset of a pandemic may be 
identified.  
Similarly, a startup company based in India, Indian 
Robotics Solutions (IRS), has developed “Thermal Corona 
Combat Drone”. This drone can detect elevated body 
temperature, sanitize an area, carry a portable medical box 
to carry medicines or COVID-19 testing kits and uses a 
loudspeaker to provide instructions [20].  
Moormann proposed an emergency ambulance to deliver 
medical equipment and medicine supplies for areas hard to 
reach [21]. Back in 2005, drones were deployed to assess 
the damages and to check on the state of the survivors post 
hurricane Katrina. 
IV. PRIVACY CHALLENGES 
Traditional methods for protecting privacy have shown a 
significant lack of integrity regarding privacy and security. 
Eliminating personal identity information (PII) only or using 
an anonymous ID is not at all sufficient to assure privacy to 
the users. Another prime issue for assuring data privacy is 
managing computational data used in the cryptographic 
method [10]. 
The adversary can tag his mobile phone with the ACT 
app to a carrier, namely a trained animal like dog, or a 
vehicle or even to a drone. This will broadcast false 
proximity to the mass people. The adversary may target any 
specific person and hamper privacy as well. This kind of 
privacy violation leads to waste of expensive diagnosis 
resources as well as trust in ACT apps which will be 
devastating [1]. 
Moreover, the adversary can attempt to undermine the 
system efficiency by deducing the sensitive privacy of the 
honest mobile phone users. To be precise, the adversary 
tries to provide a false report, i.e. compel the health 
authority into falsely believing that a person is a close 
contact of any affected person. The adversary can also try to 
track a person down by following public information and 
mapping the hacked or controlled mobile phones 
information [8]. 
The original HIPAA clearly defined that one of the three 
classes for which privacy regulations were applicable was 
health care providers who collect and store health 
information in electronic form [12]. Since then numerous 
reformations have been applied on it. Usually, after any 
major incident, HHS issues a press release. For example, 
protected health information (PHI) of approximately 3,800 
individuals was lost by a workforce member of a medical 
center as the member’s device got lost in an airport. The 
device was neither encrypted nor password protected. Same 
occurrence could happen to ACT apps also.   
While HIPAA focuses on privacy rules which do not 
specify the concept of authorization, GDPR proposed by the 
EU specifies the idea of consent [12]. Privacy rules allow 
the right to revoke, on the other hand GDPR allows right to 
withdrawal of consent. GDPR’s right to erasure is 
applicable to ACT apps, i.e. users should have rights to be 
forgotten. This will prevent misuse of stored private data 
after any epidemic/pandemic ends. Privacy rules of HIPAA 
do not provide these rights [12] and lead to potential privacy 
violations in the future. 
On the other hand, drone surveillance may introduce the 
violation of privacy especially if the data in the form of 
image or video is downloaded by an alien intruder. Images 
or videos of an individual stolen from a drone during an 
upload or from the cloud server where the drones store all 
its data may be used in any malicious way against the 
individual. Some image formats, such as JPEG contain 
information about the location and time of the photo in the 
image header files [17]. Therefore with every stolen picture 
extra individual privacy will be violated.  
V. SECURITY CHALLENGES 
Along with eavesdropping, injection, relay attack and 
replay attack, the attacks known as power drain attack or 
storage drain attack can be executed as well to make the 
attacked device busy or slowing down by sending a large 
amount of notification. The device drains its power every 
time it wakes up to receive a notification and uses up its 
storage to store those notifications. The power and storage 
drain attacks may not appear as a severe issue, but in the 
long run may lead to opting out of the ACT apps and pose a 
severe threat to the society [1]. 
Also, some strict companies or conservative individuals 
[4] may not allow the CT process running on their premises. 
This will block the pseudonym exchange through jamming 
the respective channels. 
Eavesdropping, especially passive or unnoticed 
eavesdropping attack works well in decentralized systems, 
for example the decentralized privacy preserving proximity 
tracing (DP-3T). As used pseudonyms of affected 
individuals are published without any measure, users can be 
denominated by joining their successive pseudonyms with 
deduction of their day-to-day movements [4]. 
Bluetooth based ACT systems are risky as the adversary 
can generate false alarms regarding contacts with an 
affected person using a powerful antenna The adversary can 
also disrupt or track the user's contact tracing  [5]. 
In case of drone-based monitoring systems, the operation 
and control of a drone depends on several wireless sensors, 
e.g. Wi-Fi/Radio Frequency (RF) module, GPS etc. 
Therefore, it is vulnerable to be hijacked. By spoofing the 
GPS signal [22-23], the GPS signal used by the drone for its 
navigation is overlapped with an artificially generated GPS 
signal. When the simulated signal strength is higher than the 
actual GPS signals from the satellite, the drone can be 
maneuvered successfully by feeding in false GPS 
coordinates. Through hacking the control signal [22], as the 
radio signal used for communicating with the drone is 
generally not encrypted, listening to the RF signals, using a 
RF receptor, the signal can then be easily decoded to gain 
partial or full control of the drone and any of the on board 
systems, sensors etc. In case of wireless connection request 
[24], if the drone is targeted and sent a continuous flow of 
wireless connection requests within a short time interval, 
this overloads the central processing unit of the drone and 
results in a shutdown of the entire system. 
Most of the drones are imported or assembled using 
components manufactured in a foreign country. So there is 
always a possibility that the state sponsored manufacturing 
company may use their devices for surveillance, to spy, and 
extract sensitive information. Once a drone is compromised 
than other devices or drones on the same network are also 
exposed to be hijacked. 
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS 
 We recommend the following to preserve privacy during 
ACT systems: 
(a) As per GDPR, the right to be forgotten has to be 
implemented to prevent app data usage after 
pandemic ends. 
(b) HIPAA is health specific only, whereas GDPR is 
applicable in a broad spectrum. Still, we have to 
implement the need basis acts for privacy to some 
countries, especially the South Asian ones. 
(c) Public concern surveys need to be taken to raise 
mass awareness.  
(d) As the app documentation is missing, mass people 
are in the dark regarding their privacy issues. 
Therefore, proper documentation is needed. 
(e) The authors [4] of DP-3T proposed the concept of 
beacon secret sharing to reduce and restrict passive 
eavesdropping. Instead of advertising the actual 
whole pseudonyms, only fractions of pseudonyms 
are broadcasted. The other side gathers a required 
number of shares to deduce the original pseudonym 
of the sender. This approach makes it quite hard for 
a publicly located BLE to gather meaningful 
pseudonyms from a person who is just passing by. 
 The following steps could be taken to preserve privacy 
during drone-based monitoring systems:  
(a) Drones can be used for tracing in case of lack of 
awareness or inadequate usage of smart phones 
among the mass people.  
(b) Upload compressed photos. If a photo is 
compressed then most of the information in the 
image header file is erased to minimize the size of 
the file [23]. This will ensure that the information 
of a person’s whereabouts are erased from an 
image providing more privacy if the image is 
stolen. 
(c) Add noise intentionally to distort the picture and 
store it in a secured network. This will ensure full 
privacy of an individual even if the image is stolen 
by some alien user. But if only one type of noise is 
added then by estimating the noise level variance 
from the noise statistics, most of the original image 
information can be restored [25]. Therefore it 
would be wise to superimpose at least two types of 
noise. If the image information is required, it can 
be recovered by specific algorithms known only to 
the legal authorities. 
(d) Ask consent form people to allow the drones to 
take pictures if necessary for contact tracing only.  
(e) If an image of an individual is taken, the person 
can be notified by the authority, via SMS or email, 
about the date, location and time when the image 
was taken.  
(f) An indicator in the form of a red blinking light may 
be activated while the drone is recording or taking 
the image of an individual. 
(g) A signboard can be installed indicating a drone 
surveillance zone. This will make people aware 
about any drone that might capture an image of 
them for contact tracing. 
  
 Recommendations for security challenges regarding ACT 
systems: 
(a) To prevent cyber attack, raising awareness is 
important. Unsuspecting person is vulnerable to 
this attack more often; therefore, proper learning 
should be arranged. 
(b) App manual should cover the topic of how to be 
secured from hackers. 
(c) Advertisements or commercials could be prepared 
to let users know about fraudulent activities. 
(d) User misuse can create more security threats than 
adversarial activities, so users have to be 
responsible while dealing with sensible data. 
(e) As the decentralized architecture is more 
susceptible towards security threats [4], the 
centralized or hybrid approaches could be 
followed. 
 
 The following recommendations could be explored for 
security challenges regarding drone-base monitoring 
systems: 
(a) Wireless charging stations must be provided at 
specific locations. In this way, the drones can 
operate for a longer time and need not be flown 
back to the ground control for recharging the 
battery.  
(b) Every command given to the drone must be 
encrypted and once the command is received by the 
drone it should have the algorithm to decode and 
extract the information. This will ensure that when 
a drone is hacked it would not respond to 
commands from other alien sources.  
(c) Before a data, image or a video is uploaded to a 
designated authorized network, a security 
handshake must be successfully executed to 
prevent data theft. 
(d) The drones can also have a separate emergency 
channel. In case any foreign user takes control over 
a drone, a signal may be sent over the emergency 
channel which will force the drone to stop 
communicating over the normal channel and will 
follow a protocol to fly back to the ground control. 
(e) Any firmware or software must be updated 
regularly to minimize the chances of being 
compromised and any password to access a drone 
must be changed regularly. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
To conclude, it is safe to say that DSSs should be used 
properly aligned to privacy acts and security measures. Both 
ACT and drone surveillance could be vulnerable to privacy 
and security challenges. However, this paper not only 
summarizes the challenges, but also provides several 
recommendations to consider. In the near future, these 
recommendations could be explored further and 
implemented to enhance the current situation. Since 
COVID-19 is staying for long and recurring, there is no 
other option than staying safe. Appropriate usage of DSSs 
can ensure this safety and constant improvements should be 
carried out to make smooth operations.   
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